G.E. Moore

George Edward Moore, known as G. E. Moore (London, 4 november 1873 - 24 October Cambridge, 1958), was an influential English philosopher, who studied and later became a professor at the University of Cambridge. He was, along with Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and (for him) Gottlob Frege, one of the founders of analytic philosophy.

Moore is known for his defence of an ethical non-naturalism,[1]  his emphasis on common sense in philosophical discourse, and by the eponymous Moore's Paradox. He was admired by other philosophers and by the Bloomsbury group, but is (unlike his friend and colleague Russell) less known outside the academic world. Moore's essays reveal a clear and reasonably observant writing style, and a methodical and patient approach to philosophical problems.

His most famous work Principia Ethica are in which he coined the term "naturalistic fallacy" (naturalistic fallacy) introduced, and his essays The Refutation of Idealism, A Defence of Common Sense, and A Proof of the External World.



Content
[hide] *1 Philosophy  ==Philosophy[ Edit] == Moore was critical of the philosophy because it knew no progress. This lack is in sharp contrast with the progress made in the natural sciences since the renaissance. He often praised the analytic reasoning of Thales of Miletus, an early Greek philosopher, because of his analysis of the meaning of the term "landscape architecture". Moore thought Thales ' reasoning was a rare example of philosophical research with practical consequences. He was also an important critic of British idealism, which he himself with it broke, and the analytical method as an alternative with it helped develop. ===Skepticism[ Edit] === He is mainly known for its fierce battle against any form of skepticism. [2]  his own philosophy can be typified as a common sense philosophy: common sense was not correct and had to be legitimised according to Moore. Skeptical doubts of all kinds were for Moore out of the question. The philosopher Ernest Gellner argued that "Descartes once started a new philosophic tradition by trying to doubt everything. Moore started another by firmly refusing to doubt anything. [...] Moore refused to leave common sense at the door with his umbrella when he came in to do philosophy." [3]  Moore reacted especially vehemently against the scepticism about the existence of an external world: we wouldn't certainly can know if there is an outside world exists at all. In fact its argumentation from two arguments. A is directly addressed to Bertrand Russell, which designated a kind of skepticism. Moore points out, however, that one should do four assumptions:
 * 1.1 Skepticism
 * 1.2 Ethics
 * 1.3 philosophy of language
 * Work 2
 * 3 external links

<p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:20.3636360168457px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.63636302948px;">Moore will now, however, argue that there is no reason to state that these four assumptions assumptions like "this pencil is more plausible than" or "you are a conscious being". He writes: <p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:inherit;">"I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four. [...] Nay more: I do not think it is rational to be as certain of any one of these four propositions as one of the proposition that I do know that this is a pencil."<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-4" len="163" style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;"> [4] <p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:20.3636360168457px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.63636302948px;">The most famous argument, however, is the second. Here he tries to demonstrate the knowledge of the outside world by referring to certain technicalities of which we are so sure that they exist, and thus one must recognize the existence of an external world. He writes: <p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:inherit;">''I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, "Here is one hand," and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, "and here is another." And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers or other ways: there is no need to multiply examples.''<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-5" len="163" style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;"> [5] ===Ethics<span class="mw-editsection" len="332" style="-webkit-user-select:none;font-size:small;margin-left:1em;line-height:1em;display:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">[ Edit<span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">] === <p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:20.3636360168457px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.63636302948px;">One of the most important works by Moore was his Principia Ethica in 1903 appeared in which he the notion "naturalistic fallacy" (naturalistic fallacy) introduced. This is a fallacy that is committed when a philosopher according to Moore the notion of "the good" trying to establish it in a "natural" concept as pleasure or degree of civility.
 * 1) I know these things can not immediately (for example, the outside world)
 * 2) They follow not logical and necessary out of something else where I'm familiar with it right away
 * 3) My knowledge would (this follows from (1) and (2)) should be based on an analogy proof or any type of induction.
 * 4) The knowledge that comes about in this way, is no sure knowledge.

<p style="margin-top:0.5em;margin-bottom:0.5em;line-height:20.3636360168457px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.63636302948px;">Theories include for example the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham or the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer. According to Moore are such redefinitions of "the good" invalid because one still can ask if that matters (such as pleasure or civilization) is really good. These questions remain open for discussion, while according to Moore as pleasure or civilization really match would come with the good, then this would be trivial to answer questions are. ===Philosophy Of Language<span class="mw-editsection" len="339" style="-webkit-user-select:none;font-size:small;margin-left:1em;line-height:1em;display:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">[ Edit<span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">] === <p style="margin-top:0.5em;line-height:20.3636360168457px;color:rgb(37,37,37);font-family:sans-serif;font-size:13.63636302948px;">On the other hand, Moore also known by the raise of a paradox in the language, known by the term Moore's paradox: one can the phrase "it's raining, but I don't believe it." how to pronounce without in any logical contradiction to expire. This while still in some way as happens to nonsensical: it is not clear how one can believe and that it rains, and at the same time can be convinced to the contrary of this statement. Also the term "Moorean phrases" used, as coined by Ludwig Wittgenstein who was impressed by these examples.<sup class="reference" id="cite_ref-6" len="163" style="line-height:1;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;"> [6] ==Work<span class="mw-editsection" len="332" style="-webkit-user-select:none;font-size:small;margin-left:1em;line-height:1em;display:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;unicode-bidi:-webkit-isolate;font-family:sans-serif;"><span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">[ Edit<span class="mw-editsection-bracket" len="1" style="color:rgb(85,85,85);">] ==
 * 1899 The Nature of Judgment
 * 1903 Principia Ethica
 * 1903 Review of Franz Brentano's poem "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong
 * 1903 The Refutation of Idealism
 * 1912 Ethics